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DEEP SEABED MINING AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Roy Lee* 
I must begin by admitting to certain limitations in making a 
presentation of this precise issue. As Mr. Hull has mentioned, I am 
a member of the United Nations Secretariat, not a delegate of a 
developing country. Therefore, I am in a difficult position either to 
defend or to advocate the positions of developing countries. Instead, 
I will act as a reporter summarizing the views of the developing 
countries on the various issues of seabed mining which have been 
expressed during the last few years at different times and in differ-
ent forums. 
Also, I ought to mention that although the 120 developing coun-
tries act as a group in expressing some of the basic policy issues at 
public meetings or in private consultations, there are differences of 
opinion regarding detailed provisions. Sometimes it is difficult to 
identify clearly the view of the group as a whole. 1n these cases, I 
think we will have to refer to the views as expressed by some of the 
developing countries. 
For the sake of convenience, I will present the views of the 
developing countries on the following group of issues: first, the Dec-
laration of Principles and the value of seabed mining; second, the 
role of the Enterprise; and third, the institutional arrangements. I 
will present the views as best as I understand them and as objec-
tively as possible. 
Earlier, I commented on the Declaration, but here my task is 
to present you with the view of the Group of 77 regarding the Decla-
ration of Principles. This declaration is extremely important for the 
developing countries because it lays the foundation for the promo-
tion of peaceful uses of the international seabed and its resources. 
It establishes the principles of common heritage of mankind, non-
appropriation, joint exploitation of seabed resources for the benefit 
of all, and equitable sharing of the benefit by all. Furthermore, the 
Declaration on the basis of these principles, commits the interna-
tional community to the establishment of an international regime 
and a machinery applicable to the area and its resources. 
At the last session in September, the chairman of the Group of 
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77 made a statement on the issue of unilateral legislative action. I 
will now paraphrase some of the points made at that session. First, 
the Declaration is a solemn pronouncement by the most representa-
tive organ of the international community. The General Assembly 
proclaimed that the resources of the seabed beyond national juris-
diction were the common heritage of mankind. While such resources 
could be exploited under an international regime, they could not be 
unilaterally appropriated nor could they be exploited by an individ-
ual nation. 
Second, all states, by adopting the Declaration without dissent, 
had accepted the common heritage principle, the international 
character of the seabed and its resources, and the inevitable legal 
consequences. Unilateral exploitation was incompatable with these 
principles. 
Third, the Declaration was the result of several years of prepa-
ratory work and intensive negotiations in the General Assembly and 
in the committee in which all states participated. The Declaration, 
therefore, is a text which establishes a prin"ciple of international law 
precisely within the meaning of article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. 1 It expresses the opinion of the inter-
national community and embodies current international law re-
garding the regime of the seabed. 
Fourth, unilateral legislative action, by a state or a group of 
states, regarding exploitation of the international seabed before a 
universally agreed international regime was established, would be 
contrary to the Declaration. It would also be contrary to interna-
tional law. 
Fifth, as was agreed at the beginning of the conference, the 
present negotiations on the seabed regime and machinery constitute 
an integral part of a package deal upon which the whole treaty of 
the law of the sea is to be constructed. The Group of 77 reaffirmed 
the inseparability and interrelatedness of the different aspects of the 
law of the sea currently being negotiated at the Conference in the 
various committees. Unilateral legislative action would, therefore, 
prejudice present negotiations, and might well precipitate a chaotic 
situation with regard to law of the sea. The failure of such an impor-
tant conference would adversely affect the whole system of multilat-
eral negotiations and would result in repercussions within the 
United Nations for generations to come. 
1. l.C.J. Stat., art. 38. 
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After this statement was reaffirmed by the Group of 77, it was 
supported by several developed countries including: Sweden, Nor-
way, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Australia. The 
United States also issued a supporting statement which was en-
dorsed by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
and Japan. 
It is necessary to emphasize that while the industrial countries 
have one very clear and concrete objective, seabed mining, the de-
veloping countries have much broader and more general goals. In 
the following illustrations, I will explain how the developing coun-
tries perceive the issue of seabed mining. It is hoped that this will 
make their position more understandable and will facilitate negotia-
tions. 
You may recall that in 1967 a large sector of the international 
community expressed anxiety over the competitive military exploi-
tation of the strategic potential of the seabed and the ocean floor 
beyond national jurisdiction. A U .N. Committee was established in 
order to divert this trend. Its initial purpose was to exclude military 
uses of the seabed and to promote peaceful uses. It was against this 
historical background that the present First Committee of the law 
of the sea conference executed their tasks. This represents a com-
mitment on the part of the developing countries and the interna-
tional community, as a whole, to devote the potential of the seabed 
and its resources to peaceful uses. 
The question of seabed mining is not just a simple problem of 
money; it goes far beyond the issue of sharing the financial benefit. 
For the developing countries, the question is how to implement 
faithfully the international seabed regime and machinery which 
were proclaimed by the Declaration. In their view, seabed mining 
must be conducted in conformity with the principles already de-
clared by the General Assembly, particularly the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind. To them, this principle means that 
exploitation of resources must be a joint operation by all who are 
interested. Developing countries are opposed to the idea of leaving 
exploitation of the seabed resources to a few private firms and com-
panies. All activities must be carried out by an internationalized 
agency on behalf of mankind. It is mankind, through whatever 
agency it may decide to appoint, that has the right to dispose of the 
resources in one way or another. According to the developing coun-
tries, the Authority cannot be just an administrative body, it must 
have the discretionary power to select its agencies. 
Many devel"ping countries recognize that this is the first time 
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that property will be entrusted to an international organization 
which will administer and manage the area and its resources on 
behalf of mankind. Therefore, seabed mining provides a unique 
opportunity for the world community to share in the benefits of 
resource exploitation. This is why developing nations prefer an in-
ternational exploitation system. 
Some of the developing countries view the forthcoming interna-
tional regime machinery as an example of measures which may be 
taken in the context of the establishment of a new international 
economic order. This is the reason why they have insisted that the 
treaty embody some general economic policies. However, for some 
developed countries this is not relevant, and it simply presents an 
obstacle to the negotiations. 
In multilateral negotiations, all these views are equally valid 
and cannot be disregarded. They must be respected and taken into 
account. I do not think this is different from any other democratic 
decision making processes. I understand that in Syracuse you are 
facing a controversial issue concerning the building of a new stad-
ium. In the last four years, various views have been expressed. How-
ever radical they may seem, the viewpoints put forth by one side 
have to be respected by the other side in the process of decision 
making. 
As Mr. Young mentioned, some of the developing countries 
have also emphasized the question of technology transfer. I think it 
should be made clear that these countries are not only interested in 
the recovery system or the processing techniques. Instead, as in the 
area of space exploration, they are interested in the potential appli-
cation of seabed technology. Overemphasis on the questions of pat-
ents and propriety rights would miss the point completely. Such an 
interpretation would not be conducive to a general understanding 
of the broader issues that are at the heart of the negotiations. 
Perhaps this shows that it would be wrong to view seabed min-
ing purely as a commercial operation of economic interests. I hope 
these examples illustrate the fact that developing countries see the 
issue of seabed mining in a broad perspective. Perhaps, they will 
help to explain the positions taken by the developing countries on 
the issues of the exploitation system, the production ceilings, and 
the institutional arrangements. 
My next topic concerns the views of developing countries on the 
role of the Enterprise. The above presentation should clearly ex-
plain why the developing countries cannot accept a licensing or a 
concession approach to seabed mining. Instead, they are now con-
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sidering a parallel system. For some developing countries the paral-
lel exploitation system would entail the acceptance of state compa-
nies and multinationals as cutthroat competitors. This would create 
a drastic change in the developing nations' conception of the Enter-
prise's role. Previously, these countries viewed the Enterprise as the 
sole and exclusive operational arm of the Authority. Therefore, ac-
ceptance of a parallel system is viewed as a great concession since 
it would place the Enterprise in the disadvantageous position of 
competing with private firms and state companies which have ad-
vanced technology and management experience. This explains why 
the developing countries think that the treaty should give the Enter-
prise certain favorable conditions in terms of financing and technol-
ogy. I believe we will hear more on these issues from Ambassador 
Aldrich. 
Another concern of some of the developing countries is the ab-
sence of a guaranteed market for the Enterprise. In the present text, 
the Enterprise has to submit a workable plan for the approval by 
the Legal and Technical Commission. As we shall see, the develop-
ing nations believe that the Legal and Technical Commission is 
under the control of the industrial countries, and, therefore, it would 
not allow the Enterprise to have an effective role. 
I will now discuss the views of the developing nations on some 
of the institutional arrangements. First, although the treaty charac-
terizes the Assembly as the supreme organ of the Authority, some 
of the developing countries believe that such a characterization is 
purely cosmetic. Their reasoning is that a careful examination 
would indicate that the substantive powers and functions are allo-
cated to the Council and some of the functional commissions. The 
Assembly, like the General Assembly, functions as a forum for views 
and policy statements. The actual control remains in the hands of 
the Council and the functional commissions. Furthermore, most of 
the functions entrusted to the Assembly cannot be exercised unless 
a recommendation has been made by the council. There is also a 
provision in Article 1562 regarding noninterference between the 
2. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Sixth Session, Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 52/WP.10 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 1108 
(1977). Section 5, article 156, paragraph 4 in speaking of organs of the authority states: 
the principal organs shall each be responsible for exercising those powers and func-
tions which have been conferred on them. In exercising such powers and functions, 
each organ shall act in a manner compatible with the distrubution of powers and 
functions among the various organs of the authority as provided for in this part of 
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major organs of the Authority. According to this provision, no organ 
is allowed to interfere with another organ. 
There are these built-in constitutional constraints as well as 
certain procedural constraints. According to the present text, the 
decisions of the Assembly must be made by a two-thirds majority, 
present and voting. However, there is another provision whereby 
one-fifth of the members, when considering an issue for the first 
time, may defer a decision. There is also a provision that one-
quarter of the members may request an advisory opinion after a 
decision has been made. In the view of some of the developing coun-
tries, these provisions will inevitably delay the decision-making pro-
cess and thereby affect the effectiveness of the Assembly. In other 
words, it is their opinion that the Assembly is not going to be as 
effective as some other advocates have claimed. 
Now I will discuss the Council, which is the executive organ. It 
is composed of thirty-six members, eighteen of which will be allo-
cated for interest groups and the remainder will be allocated accord-
ing to geographical distribution. Decisions are to be made by a 
three-quarter majority of the members present and voting provided 
that such a majority includes a majority of the members participat-
ing in that session. According to some of the developing countries, 
under the present composition and decision making procedures, the 
Council will be more readily influenced by the developed countries 
than by the developing nations. 
Developing countries view the Council as the most powerful 
organ because of its great variety of powers. For example, it may 
issue directives to the Enterprise and examine control over its activ-
ities; it may adopt and apply rules, regulations, and procedures; it 
may initiate proceedings before the seabed dispute chamber; and it 
may issue emergency orders. The power of the Council is in article 
160, paragraph 2, subitem 10.3 Under subparagraph 10, a recom-
mendation from the Legal and Technical Commission on the issu-
ance of a contract would remain.valid, if, after sixty days the Coun-
cil has not adopted a different decision. In other words, once the 
3. id. Section 5, article 160, paragraph 2, subitem 10 states: 
In addition the Council shall ... approve on behalf of the Authority, after review 
by the Technical Commission, formal written plans of work, for the conduct of 
activities in the Area, drawn up in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 151. In so 
doing the Council shall act expeditiously. The plan of work shall be deemed to have 
been approved, unless a decision to disapprove it is taken within 60 days of its 
submission by the Technical Commission. 
id., Section 5, article 160, paragraph 2, subitem x. 
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Technical and Legal Commission made a recommendation, it would 
be very difficult for the Council to change the Commission's deci-
sion. In the view of developing nations, this provision anticipates a 
situation of paralysis in the Council. In the event of such a situation, 
the recommendation by the Technical and Legal Commission could 
still be implemented even though the Council would be paralyzed. 
Finally I will discuss the Legal and Technical Commission. 
Some of the developing countries believe that the Legal and Techni-
cal Commission is the most important commission, because, as I 
have already mentioned, it approves or disapproves of plans of work 
submitted by a private contractor or by an enterprise. Under the 
present text, the developing countries fear that because of the re-
quirement of qualification of the members of the Legal and Techni-
cal Commission, the commission would be more readily influenced 
by the developed countries. This is because the members will be 
composed of delegates largely from the developed nations. These 
members are nominated by state party, and are elected by the 
Council. 
The developing countries also have very specific views on the 
question of production policy, financial arrangements, and the sys-
tem of exploitation. However, we have other distinguished speakers 
who will deal with these topics this afternoon. 
In conclusion, I believe that we are facing a Solomon-type situ-
ation in which two women claimed the same child as their own. The 
solution was to cut the child in half. From the above presentation 
it should be clear that developing countries think that the Assembly 
will be paralyzed. Others also believe that the Council will be para-
lyzed. Now what is next? Are we going to paralyze the functional 
commissions as well, simply because of the divergent interests? I 
think the trend is very discouraging. While all interests and con-
cerns should be taken into account and protected, the solution we 
are seeking must protect the basic objective that we are looking for 
in this area. 
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
MR. HULL: Thank you, Roy. Before I turn the discussion to the 
panelists, let me try to clarify a couple of terms that you have heard 
today, probably for the first time in some instances. When we talk 
about the Enterprise, the Assembly, the Council, the Seabed Dis-
pute Chamber, and the Legal and Technical Commission, we are 
talking about segments of the International Authority. The Author-
ity is the overall body which is recognized as playing an important 
role in the exploitation of the deep seabed. The second term that 
you have heard just now is the Group of 77. I am not sure, at this 
point, if the Group of 77 is up to 116, 118, or 120 today. What the 
term refers to is a group that was first formed in Caracas in 1974. 
At that time there were some seventy-seven countries in the devel-
oping world which banded together to develop what was viewed as 
a common position. The differences between today and 1974 are: 
first, instead of seventy-seven countries there are 120, and second, 
there is no common position. With that clarification, I would like 
to turn the discussion over to the speakers. 
MR. HERMAN: I would like to ask Roy Lee a couple of questions. 
Before doing so, I should preface what I have to say by stating that 
these are my personal comments and reflections. They do not repre-
sent the views of the Canadian government. 
Let us assume that there are real problems with the Law of the 
Sea Conference and that those problems involve both process and 
substance. I have proposals for dealing with the process, but let us 
look at the substance. In my view, the substance is too complex to 
be resolved in the next few years. If we could improve on the sub-
stance by simplification of the issues in a way which did not meet 
with every preoccupation of the developing countries, but which 
would pretty well insure that we got a treaty tomorrow, then I think 
it is possible. Perhaps it would be politically difficult, but I think it 
possible. What would be the advantages? I must speak very gener-
ally because of the time limitations. 
It seems to me that we could get a treaty if we organized a 
council system which provided for some type of concurrent majority, 
which admittedly the developing countries do not like; if we abol-
ished some of the transfer of technology provisions; if we provided 
for a fairly simplified and unstructured system of financial obliga-
tions; and if we provided assurances that the Enterprise would have 
some means of getting into business. I want to leave aside the ques-
tion of production ceilings because I have not quite figured out how 
that would work into this structure. I may be oversimplifying, but I 
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think we could get a treaty. The result would be a tremendous 
symbolic achievement for the United Nations system. We would 
have an international body which, for the first time, would have 
some sort of regulatory authority over resources. I cannot think of 
anything in the long term which is more important than that. I 
wondered if you had any thoughts from the standpoint of the devel-
oping countries and from the point of view of a United Nations civil 
servant on that kind of approach, an approach which admittedly 
would not meet many of the preoccupations of the developing coun-
tries. 
MR. LEE: Yes; as I mentioned in the beginning, I am not a 
delegate from the developing countries. Therefore, it would be inap-
propriate for me to answer as to what position they would take. But 
I am glad you asked me about my views as a member of the United 
Nations Secretariat. I could not agree with you more on the general 
outline you just gave. I think it would be very significant to reach 
such an agreement. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: Mr. Lee, you stated at the begin-
ning of your remarks that the United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions oppose unilateral exploitation of the deep seabed. Could 
you comment on whether or not it would constitute unilateral ex-
ploitation of the deep seabed if one country proceeded with deep 
seabed mining but set aside a reasonably determined percentage of 
its revenues for distribution to mankind rather than for the benefit 
of that individual nation? In other words, if the United States were 
to set aside, say five percent of the profits from deep seabed mining 
operations for distribution to mankind under such basis as a treaty 
might develop, would that constitute exploitation in your 
judgment? 
MR. LEE: It would have been a very difficult question to answer 
had not the Group of 77 made a clear statement on that issue. I have 
told you what they have said and it is up to you to interpret their 
opinion from that statement. I think that would constitute exploita-
tion. 
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: Rather than asking Roy a question, be-
cause, as he said, he cannot speak for the Group of 77, I would 
simply make a comment which, I think, might be helpful to the 
audience. That is, of all ,the issues which Roy mentioned, I think the 
single most important one is the issue of decision making-how 
decisions are made within the International Seabed Authority. This 
issue involves the roles and organs of the Council, the Assembly, 
their composition, and their voting structure. What we find is that 
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developing countries, in general, wish to see the new international 
organization represent the principle of one nation, one vote, and to 
the extent that there are any limited bodies such as the Council, the 
developing nations think that such bodies should take into account 
and give at least as much emphasis as possible to the concept of 
equitable geographic representation. What the industrial countries 
are saying, on the other hand, is that geographic representation has 
absolutely no relation to anything that makes any sense in the 
world. It does not have any relation to political questions, and more 
importantly, for an organization which is going to control access to 
what will eventually become a very important mineral resource, it 
has no relation to economic interests. While we must, in the late 
twentieth century, take into account and pay respect to the sover-
eign equality of states and the concept of one state, one vote, we 
have to temper that respect with provisions which will recognize real 
economic interests and which will try to give them at least a mini-
mum degree of protection. Otherwise, industrialized nations cannot 
be expected to agree to the treaty. I think this question may be the 
most important single issue on which the possible success of the 
Conference depends. How many of the key representatives of the 
developing countries have really accepted the fact that if there is 
going to be an International Seabed Authority, it is going to have 
to give some deference to the recognition of real economic interests? 
It is obvious that even when economics are ignored, the issue is seen 
in terms of human democracy, there is no relation between one 
state-one vote and the representation of people. It is, in any demo-
cratic sense, an absurdity. 
The real economic interests are very narrowly limited in this 
negotiation. I think the primary interests of the developing nations 
concern assurance that the organization sets a precedent for move-
ment toward the new economic international order by trying to take 
a resource which is beyond national jurisdiction and seeing that it 
is administered in a fashion that recognizes the developing nation's 
interests, not simply the interests of those who are producers and 
consumers. These nations also have a monetary interest in sharing 
revenues, but realistically speaking, division of revenues amongst 
120 developing countries cannot amount to more than a pittance in 
the end. 
Certainly, there is potential for larger shares of revenues from 
petroleum production on the outer continental shelf than there is 
from deep seabed mining. So, these nations do not very heavily 
weigh the respective economic inflow of money from seabed mining. 
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They have some interest in the technical education of their people 
who will have jobs in the International Authority of the seabed 
enterprise. They also have an interest in the people from their coun-
tries who will gain experience in the management of a large opera-
tional and regulatory body. But I think it is demonstratively clear 
that no developing country is willing to allocate funds for seabed 
mining. They have got more important priorities for their money, 
and they are not about to invest anything in seabed mining. Very 
few of the developing nations have significant markets for the min-
erals. The nickel, manganese, and cobalt from the seabed will go to 
a handful of industrialized countries which need it for their indus-
tries. The capital to exploit the resources will come from an even 
smaller number of industrialized countries. 
The other major economic interests come from the countries 
which produce the same metals from land sources. Ninety or ninety-
five percent of the real economic interest at stake rests with approxi-
mately twenty countries. Now, in my judgment, unless the develop-
ing countries recognize that the ninety or ninety-five percent eco-
nomic interest has to be given reasonable assurances that actions 
will not be taken by a body which is totally controlled through one 
nation-one vote by a large majority of states which have a very 
small economic interest and a high ideological interest, there will 
not be any organization. That has been the toughest, longest fought, 
and, perhaps, the least productive issue thus far in the negotiations. 
It may be the last issue to be settled but it will have to be settled, 
and these realities will have to be recognized if this organization is 
going to be created. Thank you. 
DR. McKELVEY: Roy you did an admirable job of technically 
reporting the views of the developing countries. But I wonder if it 
would not be fair and objective also to report that seabed resources 
are the common heritage of mankind and should be developed for 
the benefit of all mankind, especially with regard to the needs of the 
developing countries. That phrase, I think, is one commonly used 
throughout the Conference and I think it should be kept in mind in 
explaining the views of the developing nations. 
MR. LEE: Yes, I agree with you. 
MR. HULL: Thank you very much, Roy. 
11
Lee: Developing Countries
Published by SURFACE, 1979
